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Abstract. The foundation of zero-knowledge is the simulator : a weak
machine capable of pretending to be a weak verifier talking with all-
powerful provers. To achieve this, simulators need some kind of advantage
such as the knowledge of a trapdoor. In existing zero-knowledge multi-
prover protocols, this advantage is essentially signalling, something that
the provers are explicitly forbidden to do. This advantage is stronger than
necessary, as it is possible to define a sense in which simulators need much
less to simulate. We define a framework in which we can quantify the
simulators’ non-local advantage and exhibit examples of zero-knowledge
protocols that are sound against local or entangled provers that are not
sound against no-signalling provers precisely because the no-signalling
simulation strategy can be adopted by malicious provers.
1 Introduction
An interactive proof is a dialog between two parties: a polynomial-time verifier
and an all-powerful prover [1,2]. They agree ahead of time on some language L
and a string x. The prover wishes to convince the verifier that x ∈ L. If this is
true, the prover should succeed almost all the time; if not, the prover should fail
almost all the time. This is a generalization of the complexity class NP, except
instead of simply being handed a polynomial-sized witness, the verifier is allowed
to quiz the prover. The set of languages that admit an interactive proof is called
IP.
An interactive proof is zero-knowledge if the verifier learns nothing except
the truth of “x ∈ L”. This is usually defined by saying that a distinguisher is
unable to tell apart a real conversation between the prover and the verifier, and
one which is generated by a lone polynomial-time simulator. We will denote sets
of zero-knowledge interactive proofs with a ZK bold prefix.
The multi-prover model was introduced in [3]. This model consists of multi-
ple, non-communicating? ? ? provers talking to a single verifier. We will abbrevi-
ate “multi-prover interactive proof” as MIP and the set of languages which can
be accepted by MIPs as the boldface MIP.
? Supported in part by FRQNT (INTRIQ) and NSERC (CryptoWorks21 and Discov-
ery grant program).
?? Supported in part by Professors Va´clav Chva´tal, Jeremy Clark, Claude Cre´peau,
and David Ford.
? ? ? The precise meaning of these words shall become a lot clearer throughout the rest
of this paper.
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From a complexity perspective, the zero-knowledge aspect of interactive proofs
is characterized by IP = ZKIP† = PSPACE for single-prover IPs ([4,5,6]), and
MIP = ZKMIP = NEXP for multi-prover IPs ([3,7,8,9,10,11,12]). The (con-
jectured) necessity of complexity assumptions for zero-knowledge in the single-
prover case was the initial motivation for the multi-prover model.
1.1 A Cryptographic Perspective
The foundation of zero-knowledge is the idea of a simulator : a machine, with no
more power than the verifier, which can pretend to having interacted with all-
powerful provers. Obviously, this simulator cannot accomplish this task without
some kind of advantage (something independent of knowledge). In single-prover
zero-knowledge proofs, this advantage can be in the form of the ability to rewind
computation, the ability to discard failed simulations, or knowledge of a trapdoor
in a commitment scheme. In multi-prover zero-knowledge proofs, the advantage
in existing literature can be summed up as signalling : the simulator, acting in
the name of several provers, knows secrets which real provers, in a real instance
of the protocol, would not because they are unable to communicate.
From a complexity perspective, this simulator advantage can be anything as
long as it is truly independent of knowledge – we do not want to exclude anything
a priori. But, in practice, zero-knowledge is ultimately applied cryptography and
from a cryptographic perspective, not all advantages are equal.
1.2 Relativistic Motivation
The need for more nuanced simulators is motivated by relativistic cryptography,
an example of which can be found in [13]. Relativistic cryptography exploits
the fact that it is impossible to signal faster than light. We can enforce the no-
signalling condition of MIPs by spatially separating the provers from each other.
In order to enforce the provers’ spatial separation during the execution of the
protocol, each prover is paired with a verifier of its own, which is located nearby.
The verifiers can use the timing of the replies of their respective provers to judge
their relative distance.
In practice, this means that we can implement MIPs under relativistic as-
sumptions if the verifier can be “split” into multiple verifiers, each locally in-
teracting with its corresponding prover. An example of relativistic cryptography
can be found in [13], where a commitment was sustained for over 24 hours.
Some MIPs have verifiers which, intrinsically, cannot be split. Examples in-
clude [3] and [9]. In these examples, the verifier is used to courier an authen-
ticated message between provers. In the relativistic setting, if the verifier has
time to pass a message between provers, then the provers just signal between
themselves.
† This is for computational Zero-Knowledge. For statistical ZK however the corre-
sponding class is SZK and is most likely contained in MA, contains BPP and most
likely contains only some part of NP.
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Luckily, most MIPs in the literature have verifiers that are non-adaptive.
These verifiers’ questions to one prover are independent of the answers from all
the provers. MIPs with non-adaptive verifiers can be rewritten into a format
with multiple, split verifiers; this format we will call locality-explicit, and will be
defined formally in section 4.
As an example of what we mean, consider the following two-prover interactive
proof for graph 3-coloring:
Protocol 1. ( Simple MIP, Single-Verifier )
Two provers P1, P2, one verifier V . On input graph G, P1 and P2 agree
on a 3-coloring.
1. V asks P1 for the colors of an edge e.
2. V asks P2 for the colors of one of the nodes of e.
V accepts if and only if the colors of that edge from P1 are not equal,
and P2 corroborates with P1’s answer by replying with the same color
for the same node.
In the above protocol, V ’s questions to either prover does not depend on
answers from any prover. This is what is commonly known as a non-adaptive
verifier. We can therefore split the above verifier into a two-verifier version:
Protocol 2. ( Simple MIP, Multi-Verifier )
Two provers P1, P2, two verifiers V1, V2. On input graph G, P1 and P2
agree on a 3-coloring, V1 and V2 agree on an edge e.
1. V1 asks P1 for the colors of e.
2. V2 asks P2 for the colors of one of the nodes of e.
Post execution, V1 and V2 confer with each other, and accept if and only
if the colors of that edge from P1 are not equal, and P2 corroborates
with P1’s answer by replying with the same color.
This version of the protocol is naturally suited for relativistic implementation.
However, it is not zero-knowledge because even if P1 and P2 agreed on a randomly
selected 3-coloring each time, a dishonest verifier V2 may sample a node which
is not from e. We can make a zero-knowledge, multi-verifier MIP with the help
of the following commitment scheme, which is adapted from [3]:
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Protocol 3. ( Multi-Verifier Commitment )
Two provers P1, P2, two verifiers V1, V2. The provers share a random
string w, and the verifiers share a random string r. Operations are over
a finite field. P1 wishes to commit b.
1. (Commit) V1 sends P1 the string r. P1 replies with x = w + br.
2. (Unveil) P2 sends V2 the string w.
Post execution, the verifiers confer. They accept if and only if x+w = r
or x+ w = 0.
Combining protocol 3 and the zero-knowledge protocol of [14] gives us a
zero-knowledge, multi-verifier MIP.
Protocol 4. ( ZKMIP, Multi-Verifier )
Two provers P1, P2, two verifiers V1, V2. On input graph G, P1 and P2
agree on a randomly selected 3-coloring and 2|V | strings wi, V1 and V2
agree on an edge e and 2|V | strings ri.
1. P1 commits the colouring of G to V1 using the 2|V | wi, ri they pre-
agreed.
2. V2 asks P2 to unveil the colours of the edge e.
Post execution, V1 and V2 confer with each other, and accept if and only
if the commitment is valid, and the colors unveiled are not equal.
What makes this protocol zero-knowledge? In the commitment scheme (pro-
tocol 3), if P2 has knowledge of r, then it can break the commitment by unveiling
either way (by sending w or w + r as needed). Following the precedents set by
existing literature’s definition of zero-knowledge, the (single) simulator, inter-
acting with both verifiers, learns r. Therefore it can break the commitment and
always unveil a color that will be accepted by the verifiers.
1.3 Simulator’s Advantage
As mentioned, the (single) simulator’s advantage is its ability to interact with
both verifiers at once. This is equivalent to having a pair of simulators signal-
ing and, as we will see, is actually a tremendous power. However, it turns out
that simulators do not need to signal in order to break the above commitment
(section 3); a weaker non-local distribution will do. What we wish is to con-
struct a framework in which this “non-local advantage” of the simulators can be
quantified. We do this in section 4.
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To see how much overkill signaling is for the simulators, imagine that in the
above protocol, the distinguisher were able to eavesdrop on the “conversation”
between the (possibly malicious) verifiers and black boxes, inside of which are
either real provers, or simulators. This is giving the distinguisher more power
than simply reading a transcript; and yet, the (signaling) simulators can succeed
not only in generating the transcript, but behave as if they were provers in real-
time. If we consider existing zero-knowledge as “transcript-indistinguishable”,
then we may consider this as “eavesdrop-indistinguishable”. We will leave these
terms undefined (as intuition) as they are not the focus of this work.
1.4 Our Contributions
In this work, we propose a framework for writing MIPs which is naturally suited
for implementation and analysis under relativistic assumptions. We discuss how
this framework extends naturally to zero-knowledge protocols and quantifies
the non-local advantage which simulators use in many ZKMIPs. We show that
NEXP can be accepted by MIPs in this form, and discuss the relationship
between simulators’ non-local advantage and soundness.
We exhibit a MIP for NP which, if is zero-knowledge, then cannot be sound;
we introduce this as a tool for proving impossibility results of soundness against
no-signalling provers but it could be used for for any non-locality class similarly.
2 Previous Work
The early work by Ben-Or, Goldwasser, Kilian and Wigderson asserting that
ZKMIP = MIP from [3] and [9] use multi-round protocols and their (honest)
verifiers are inherently signaling. This is precisely why we address the situation in
this work. Proving soundness is quite subtle in this case because the provers could
use the (signaling) verifier to break binding of the commitments. In particular,
soundness will not be valid if the protocol is composed concurrently with other
executions of itself or even used as a sub-routine. In recent conversations with
Kilian [15], we have learned that controlling the impact of this signaling (via
the verifier) has been a concern since the early days of MIPs. The protocols
as they are might be sound but it is not fully proven anywhere in writing.
However, it is also clear that no considerations had been given to the fact that
general non-local correlations are possible via the verifier. If soundness rests on
the binding property of a commitment scheme (such as those zero-knowledge
proofs) and this binding property rests on the inability to achieve a certain non-
local correlation then impossibility to achieve this correlation via the verifier
must be demonstrated. It is not done or hinted in these papers.
The multi-round issue we address may seem trivial because it is a known
fact that multi-round MIPs may be reduced to a single round using techniques
of Lapidot-Shamir [16] and Feige-Lovasz [17]. Nevertheless, if interested in zero-
knowledge MIPs, commitment schemes are generally used to obtain the zero-
knowledge property and thus the single-round structure is lost in the process.
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Although single-round protocols bypass verifier’s non-local contamination prob-
lems we describe in this work, converting multi-round protocols into single-round
ones is highly inefficient and complex. Preserving zero-knowledge while achieving
single-round has turned out to be a major challenge. Practically, keeping a multi-
round protocol’s structure, using only commitments to achieve zero-knowledge
is very appealing.
In [16], Lapidot-Shamir proposed a parallel ZKMIP for NEXP, but they re-
moved the zero-knowledge claim in the journal version [18] of their work without
any explanation as of why. Feige and Kilian [10] were the last ones to follow this
approach combining techniques drawn from Lapidot-Shamir [16], Feige-Lovasz
[17] and Dwork, Feige, Kilian, Naor, and Safra, [11] to achieve a “2-prover 1-
round 0-knowledge” proof for NEXP. As far as we can tell, this is the only paper
in the ZKMIP literature that appears to avoid the multi-round problems and
the non-local contamination that we discuss. However, note that the analysis of
[10] is partly based of that of [16], and the journal version of Feige-Kilian [12]
does not contain their prior claim of zero-knowledge either. All other ZKMIPs
for NEXP in the literature are multi-round, and thus our analysis applies to
them.
Similar issues are possible using more recent results such as Ito-Vidick’s proof
[19] that NEXP ⊆MIP∗, Kalai, Raz and Rothblum’s proof [20] that MIPns=
EXP and Natarajan-Wright’s proof [21] that NEEXP ⊆ MIP∗. The reason
why these multi-round constructions may maintain their soundness despite the
potential non-locality contamination (via the verifier) is the non-adaptive nature
of their verifiers. Non-adaptive verifiers cannot take advantage of information
acquired in recent rounds to construct new questions to the provers: all their
questions are pre-established before the interaction with the provers start. This
is a special simpler case of local verifiers. Nowhere in this large literature can
one find a single statement observing the non-adaptiveness of the verifiers and
its importance to guarantee soundness of those MIPs. Moreover, their multi-
round structure requires that any straightforward extensions to ZKMIP∗ or
ZKMIPns via commitment schemes be analyzed very carefully and the locality
of the resulting verifiers be re-established. This is part of the reasons why the
ZK version did not follow easily. Recently, Chiesa, Forbes, Gur, and Spooner
[22] discovered a proof that NEXP ⊆ ZKMIP∗. Their construction is based on
refinements of Ito-Vidick’s proof and along the lines of Feige-Kilian, building on
algebraic structures to bypass the need of commitment schemes. Unfortunately,
this work is so complicated that we are unable to assess whether their verifier is
actually non-adaptive. And of course, this is not mentioned or proven anywhere
nor available from the authors... At the time of writing this paper, we just found
out that indeed ZKMIP∗ = MIP∗ as proven by Grilo, Slofstra and Yuen [23].
Bellare, Feige, and Kilian [24] considered a multi-verifier model similar to
ours in order to analyze the role of randomness in multi-prover proofs. This is
completely unrelated to our goal of analyzing verifier non-local contamination.
Finally, the notion of relativistic commitment schemes put forward by Kilian
[25] and Kent [26] leads to several results [13,27,28] where a similar multi-verifier
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model is necessary in order to assess spatial separation of the provers. The new
(non-local) zero-knowledge definition is 100% fresh from this work. No prior
work exists at all.
3 The Standard MIP Model
Multi-prover interactive proofs were introduced in [3]. The intuition for their
model was that of a detective interrogating two suspects held in different rooms.
This was formalized as follows:
Definition 1. Let P1, . . . , Pk be computationally unbounded Turing machines
and let V be a probabilistic polynomial-time TM. All machines have a read-only
input tape, a read-only auxiliary-input tape, a private work tape and a random
tape. The Pi’s share a joint, infinitely long, read-only random tape. Each Pi has
a write-only communication tape to V , and vice-versa. We call (P1, . . . , Pk, V )
a k-prover IP, or multi-prover interactive proof (MIP).
This model is essentially equivalent to that of Bell [29] who introduced his
famous Bell’s inequality to distinguish local parties from entangled parties.
Zero-knowledge MIPs were also defined in [3]:
Definition 2. Let (P1, . . . , Pk, V ) be a k-prover IP for language L. Let view(P1, . . . , Pk, V, x)
denote the verifier’s incoming and outgoing messages with the provers, and
his coin tosses‡. We say that (P1, . . . , Pk, V ) is perfect zero-knowledge for L
if there exists an expected polynomial-time machine M such that for all V ′,
view(P1, . . . , Pk, V
′, x) and M(x) are identically distributed.
Let us call the above two definitions the standard MIP model. There have
also been augmentations of the model by giving the provers various non-local
resources, such as entanglement [19], or arbitrary no-signaling power [20].
Of specific interest to us are standard MIPs which have verifiers that are
non-adaptive.
Definition 3. A verifier is non-adaptive if the verifier’s questions depend only
on its random coins and the input x. A MIP with a non-adaptive verifier is a
non-adaptive MIP.
Some zero-knowledge MIPs such as [9] require that the verifier courier an
authenticated message between the provers in order to obtain soundness while
ensuring zero-knowledge. The gist of it goes like this:
1. V asks P1 some questions.
2. V wants to check one of P1’s answers with P2 for consistency.
3. In order for zero-knowledge to hold, V must ask P2 a question it has already
asked P1.
‡ We ignore auxiliary inputs because we are not going to discuss composition.
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4. P1 authenticates a question with a key that was committed at the beginning
of the protocol and sends it to V .
5. V sends the question and the authentication to P2, who proceeds only if it
succeeds.
Steps 4 and 5 consists of V sending a message from P1 to P2. This is problem-
atic under relativistic assumptions, as discussed in the introduction. Therefore,
the no-signaling assumption of standard MIPs are not immediately compatible
with the no-faster-than-light-signaling assumption of relativity.
4 Locality-Explicit MIP
We define a framework for writing MIPs guaranteeing compatibility with rela-
tivistic assumptions. This framework uses multiple verifiers, each of which talks
to a single prover; in turn, each prover talks to that single verifier. There are
no communication tapes between the verifiers, nor are there between provers.
There is a special verifier V0 which only reads the outputs of the other verifiers;
this is the verifier that will decide to accept or reject membership to L. We call
this model “locality-explicit” since the provers and verifiers are explicitly local.
Any correlational resources available are explicitly specified via a supplemen-
tary correlator named P̂ for the provers and V̂ for the verifiers. Examples of these
resources include entanglement, no-signalling distributions, or slower-than-light
signalling.
Definition 4. An interactive Turning machine (ITM) is augmented with the
following tapes:
– k1 read-only incoming communication tapes.
– k2 write-only outgoing communication tapes.
– Private work, auxiliary-input, and random tapes.
An ITM A can signal to ITM B if A’s write-only outgoing tape is B’s read-only
incoming tape.
Definition 5. Let (P̂ , P1, . . . , Pk, V̂ , V0, V1, . . . , Vk) be a tuple of ITMs, where
the P’s are computationally all-powerful and the V’s are polynomial-time. For
each i, there are two-way communication tapes between Vi and Pi, and that for
all j, there is a two-way communication tape between V̂ and Vj and also between
P̂ and Pj. In addition, for each `, there is a read-only tape going from V` to
V0 (where V0 reads). Then, this is said to be a locality-explicit multi-prover
interactive proof.
We call P̂ and V̂ correlators and say that the provers and verifiers are P̂ -local
and V̂ -local respectively. We define the class of all MIPs with such correlators
MIPP̂
V̂
.
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Fig. 1. Locality-Explicit MIP
It is perhaps easier to understand our definition with the help of figure 1.
The solid lines represents two-way communication and the dashed arrows
represents one-way communication, with the arrow indicating the direction of
information flow.
We can define that an LE-MIP accepts a language L if the usual soundness
and completeness conditions hold:
Definition 6. An LE-MIP (V̂ , V0, V1, . . . , Vk, P̂ , P1, . . . , Pk) accepts a language
L if and only if
– (completeness) ∀x ∈ L,Pr[V0(x, t1, . . . , tk) = accept] > 2/3,
– (soundness) ∀x /∈ L,∀P ′1, . . . , P ′k,Pr[V0(x, t1, . . . , tk) = accept] < 1/3,
where ti is the read-only tape from Vi to V0 at the end of Vi’s interaction with
Pi (or P
′
i ) on input x.
Note that we do not quantify over P̂ (nor V̂ ), as we want to use them
not as (possibly malicious) participants to the protocol, but as a description of
correlational resources available to the provers and verifiers.
Definition 7. An LE-MIP is local if V̂ = P̂ = ∅ and all of the provers’
(resp. verifiers’) random tapes are initialized with the same uniformly random
string R (resp. verifiers with another, independent uniformly random string S)§.
MIPs in the standard model (with local provers) are equivalent to LE-MIPs
where P̂ = ∅ and V̂ acts as a bulletin board. That is, a single verifier com-
municating with multiple provers is equivalent to multiple verifiers individually
communicating with a local prover and each among themself.
Lemma 1. If a MIP is non-adaptive, then there exists a local LE-MIP which
accepts it.
§ By ∅ we mean the empty correlator that provides everyone with nothing at all as
output whatever the input is.
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This is obvious as a non-adaptive verifier’s questions are decided ahead of
time, once its random coins are fixed. Therefore, we may split the verifier into
one for each prover with a list of predetermined questions.
4.1 Zero-Knowledge LE-MIPs
As discussed in the introduction, zero-knowledge is defined by simulations. The
simulator of single-prover IP and standard MIP are equal to the verifier in com-
putational power, but they do have “advantages” – such as the ability to rewind
computation.
LE-MIPs makes explicit a new advantage for the simulator: non-local cor-
relations, a very powerful advantage. Using the correct non-local correlations,
simulators do not need to rewind, do not need to pretend to be multiple (iso-
lated) provers, and do not need to know any commitment-breaking secrets. In
short, they do not need to signal. Multiple, no-signaling simulators can even pro-
duce transcripts in “real-time” (example will follow) if the proper correlations
are used.
Definition 8. Let M = (M̂,M1, . . . ,Mk) be a tuple of polynomial-time ITMs.
Each machine has a random tape, and every random tape is initialized with the
same random bits. For 1 ≤ i ≤ k, there is a two-way communication tape between
M̂ and Mi. There are no communication tapes between any of the Mi’s. Then
this is called a tuple of locality-explicit simulators and M̂ is the locality class
of M, which will be abbreviated M̂ -local.
Definition 9. Let PV = (P̂ , P1, . . . , Pk, V̂ , V0, V1, . . . , Vk) be an LE-MIP for
language L. If there exists a tuple of locality-explicit simulators (Ŝ, S1, . . . , Sk),
such that for all verifiers (V̂ ′, V ′0 , V
′
1 , . . . , V
′
k), such that for all x ∈ L the tran-
scripts of conversations
(P̂ , P1, . . . , Pk, V̂
′, V ′0 , V
′
1 , . . . , V
′
k)(x)
and those generated by
({Ŝ, V̂ ′}, V ′0 , SV
′
1
1 , . . . , S
V ′k
k )(x)
are identically distributed, then we say that PV is a Ŝ-local perfect zero-knowledge
LE-MIP for L. Note that the simulators are responsible for using V̂ ′, if necessary,
to ensure that the verifier oracles¶ receive the necessary inputs.
We will denote the set of all ZK LE-MIPs where the provers, verifiers, and
simulators are P̂ -local, V̂ -local, and Ŝ-local by
ZKŜMIPP̂
V̂
.
Let S,P,V be sets of correlators. We will denote, by convention,
ZKSMIPPV
¶ Each simulator Si is restricted to oracle calls to its own corresponding V ′i .
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as the set of all ZK LE-MIPs where each correlator comes from each of the
respective sets.
Our motivations for the above definition are twofold.
First, a simulator (or simulators) should not have more power than necessary.
If two local simulators can output for two local verifiers, then it is not necessary
to have a single simulator (equivalent to two signaling simulators) do the job. In
general, finding the minimal Ŝ that will allow simulation establishes how little
extra is needed to obtain the zero-knowledge property.
Second, the non-locality of simulators is a characterization of the resilience of
zero-knowledge. A protocol with local simulators which can withstand arbitrary
(malicious) verifiers is more resilient than one in which signaling simulators are
needed.
This may be of practical interest, if transcripts are timestamped. For ex-
ample, under the relativistic assumption that one may not signal faster-than-
light, one may be able to distinguish two spatially separated simulators from
two spatially separated verifiers, if the simulators need to signal (transmit a
commitment-breaking secret) in order to generate a transcript. On the other
hand, if two entangled simulators are sufficient to produce the transcript, then
they are indistinguishable from real verifiers and provers. Our protocol 8 can be
modified as to let entangled simulators do their work, without needing PR-boxes
or signaling. Details in section 5
The complexity of LE-MIPs are the same as those of MIP, namely:
Theorem 5. There exists a LE-MIP which accepts NEXP.
The proof is a line-by-line inspection of the BFL protocol as found in [8],
and checking that the verifier is non-adaptive, and therefore can be written as
a LE-MIP. We have included a brief summary of the BFL protocol in appendix
B.
5 Zero-Knowledge LE-MIP for NEXP
The question which follows naturally is whether there exists a zero-knowledge,
local LE-MIP for NEXP where S 6⊆ SIG. By adapting the protocol from [8],
we will exhibit a protocol with the following properties:
1. The provers and verifiers are local: V̂ = P̂ = ∅.
2. The simulators need only access to instances of PR-boxes to work. That is,
Ŝ simply computes indexed instances of PR-boxes. We will abbreviate this
as “PR-local.”
We may succinctly summarize the above as:
Theorem 6. ZKPRMIP∅∅ = NEXP, where PR denotes a correlator which
simply computes PR-boxes for the simulators.
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We prove the above theorem by constructing an LE-MIP with the right
properties: protocol 8. The generic way of turning an interactive proof into a
zero-knowledge one is by running it in committed form [3,9]. With this tech-
nique, provers commit their answers instead of directly responding, and use
cryptographic techniques to convince the verifier that the answers are correct.
As argued previously, this is not possible to enforce from relativistic assumptions
alone.
Our solution essentially asks the provers to (strongly-universal-2) hash the
selected committed answer with a key that is based on the verifier’s question.
We force V2 to behave honestly (to ask a question that V1 has asked) by making
bad questions meaningless. If the verifiers ask the provers the same question,
they will receive the same hash of the same answer. Otherwise, they will receive
two independent random hash values.
The PR-type commitment (protocol 7) is secure in the local setting as previ-
ously proved in [26,30,13]. It is perfectly concealing and statistically binding. In
general, we use the commitment-box notation b as the name of a commitment
to bit b in the next two protocols.
Protocol 7. A statistically binding, perfectly concealing commitment pro-
tocol to bit b.
All parties agree on a security parameter 1k.
P1 and P2 partition their private random tape into two k-bit strings
w1, w2.
Pre-computation phase:
– V1 samples two k-bit strings z1, z2 independently and uniformly, and
provides them to V2.
– V1 sends z1 to P1 and V2 sends z2 to P2.
Commit phase:
– P1 commits b to V1 as b = (b × z1) ⊕ w1, where b × z1 is a multi-
plication in F2n .
– P2 sends V2: d = (w1 × z2)⊕ w2.
Unveiling phase:
– P1 sends w1, w2 to V1.
– V1 computes b = 1 if b ⊕ w1 = z1, or b = 0 if b = w1.
– V0 rejects if b ⊕w1 is anything but z1 or 0, or if d⊕w2 6= w1 × z2
and accepts b otherwise.
A note on notation: for a circuit f , we will denote f
(
x
)
as the gate-by-
gate committed circuit evaluated with x as the input. We also use statements
such as “P1 proves to V1 that Ω1 was computed correctly”. The reader is
expected familiarity with zero-knowledge computations on committed circuits
as put forward by [31,32,5,9].
12
Protocol 8. A local zero-knowledge LE-MIP for oracle-3-SAT
Let x = (B, r, s), an instance of oracle-3-SAT, be the common input, let
k = |x| = r + 3s + 3, and let Λ be the verifier’s program in protocol B
(see appendix).
1. Pre-computation:
(a) V1 samples two k-bit strings z1, z2 independently and uniformly,
and provides them to V2.
(b) V1 selects k+3 random bit strings R1, ..., Rk+3 (size specified im-
plicitly by Λ) and evaluates the circuit of Λ using the Ri as ran-
domness, resulting in questions Q1, ..., Qk+3, and provides them
to V2
(c) V1 randomly chooses i, 1 ≤ i ≤ k + 3, the index of an oracle
query that will be made to both P1 and P2. V1 provides i to V2.
(d) V1 sends z1 to P1 and V2 sends z2 to P2 for future commitments.
(e) All parties agree on a family of strongly-universal-2 hash func-
tions {Hi} indexed by k-bit keys.
(f) P1 and P2 agree on a k-bit index γ to the above family. P1
commits γ to V1.
2. Sumcheck with oracle:
– Let f be the arithmetization obtained in protocol 12, let z be a
string from Ir andQk+1, Qk+2, Qk+3 be strings of I
s as generated
in protocol B. V1 and P1 execute protocol 12 in committed form.
At the end of this phase, P1 shows that the committed final value
is equal to
f
(
z,Qk+1, Qk+2, Qk+3, A(Qk+1) , A(Qk+2) , A(Qk+3)
)
,
an evaluation in committed form of f using the committed val-
ues that were used during the protocol’s loop. If this fails, V1
instructs V0 to reject.
3. Multilinearity test:
(a) For 1 ≤ i ≤ k:
i. V1 sends Qi to P1,
ii. P1 commits his answer as A(Qi) .
(b) P1 and V1 evaluate a circuit description of Λ in committed form
with inputs A(Q1) , . . . , A(Qk) to verify proper linearity among
them. P1 unveils the circuit’s committed output. If it rejects, V1
instructs V0 to reject.
4. Consistency test:
(a) V1 sends i to P1.
(b) P1 computes Ω1 = A(Qi) ⊕H γ (Qi) and sends Ω1 to V1.
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(c) P1 proves to V1 that Ω1 was computed correctly, from the ex-
isting commitments.
(d) P1 unveils Ω1 for V1, who gets Ω1.
(e) V2 sends Qi to P2 (recall that this was pre-agreed in step 1.(c))
(f) P2 responds to V2 with Ω2 = A(Qi)⊕Hγ(Qi).
(g) V0 accepts if and only if all of the following conditions are met:
– Ω1 = Ω2
– All commitments which have been unveiled are valid.
– V1 did not reject in the two previous cases.
The proofs of security can be found in appendix A.
5.1 Minimal Simulator Advantage
What is the minimal simulator advantage needed for achieving zero-knowledge
for NEXP?
It is clear that signalling simulators can succeed in the above protocol. This
is the zero-knowledge simulator of standard MIPs. We can summarize this as
ZKSIGMIP∅∅ = NEXP,
where SIG is a signalling correlator.
Signalling is however unnecessary, as the binding condition of commitment
used above (protocol 7) can be broken given PR-boxes. This is what the proof
of security shows in appendix A. Thus, the simulator’s advantage can be lowered
to PR-boxes, or
ZKPRMIP∅∅ = NEXP.
If the verifiers were willing to tolerate approximately 15% of errors in the
provers’ unveiling string (z1 or 0), then it is possible to break binding with shared
entanglement [33] while maintaining soundness against local provers. Making this
slight change in the protocol reduces the simulator advantage further:
ZKENTMIP∅∅ = NEXP,
where ENT denotes polynomial amount of shared entanglement for the simula-
tors.
Ideally, the simulators would not need any non-local advantage over the veri-
fiers. However, we are unable to find a zero-knowledge MIP where the simulators
are local which can accept NEXP, or prove that it is impossible. We make the
following conjecture:
Conjecture 1. ZK∅MIP∅∅ = SZK, where SZK is the set of languages with
statistical zero-knowledge interactive proofs without computational assumptions
(i.e., graph isomorphism).
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5.2 Soundness Against No-Signalling Provers
As a further example of the drastic differences between MIP simulators’ non-
local advantages and single-prover IP simulators’ advantages (e.g., rewinding),
consider the following:
Theorem 9. Suppose that the provers in protocol 8 have access to PR-boxes
(thus they are no-signalling, but not local), then the protocol is not sound.
Proof. The provers adopt the simulators’ strategy. Since commitment binding is
broken with the aid of PR-boxes, the verifiers will always accept.
This is the sense to which we referred to as “eavesdrop indistinguishable”
from “transcript indistinguishable” earlier. A prover having the ability to rewind
computations, although enough for simulators in IPs, is not enough to break
soundness. We will generalize the above theorem in a future work, on the rela-
tionship between zero-knowledge and soundness.
Another Example In appendix E a zero-knowledge protocol for NP is ex-
tracted from [34]. This protocol is not only sound against local provers but also
against entangled provers. It is zero-knowledge in both cases. However, since
the ZK simulator (also provided in appendix E) can be implemented as no-
signalling simulators, this same protocol cannot be sound against no-signalling
provers since they can adopt exactly the simulators’ strategy.
6 Conclusions and Future Work
Zero-knowledge simulators need advantages in order to function. In the case of
MIPs, it was always implicitly assumed this advantage is necessarily signaling.
We have shown that this is not true, and that this aspect of zero-knowledge
remains unexplored. LE-MIPs make this explicit, while providing a template for
relativistic implementations of the no-signaling assumption.
We close with three open questions.
First, although the provers and verifiers of protocol 8 are local, the simulators
are not – they use PR-boxes. We do not know whether it is possible to simulate
protocol 8 with local simulators. In fact, we conjecture that there does not exist
a ZK∅MIP∅∅ protocol for any language outside SZK.
Second, as we have sketched out in section 5.1, by weakening the commitment
scheme used, we get ZKENTMIP∅∅ = NEXP. What is a minimal Ŝ such that
ZKŜMIP∅∅ = NEXP?
Third, what is the relationship between zero-knowledge and soundness in
MIPs? As we have shown in section 5.2, some simulators’ strategy can be adopted
by provers to break soundness, if only the provers had some additional (in this
case, non-local) resources. Is there a relationship between the non-local resources
needed to achieve zero-knowledge and those that are forbidden in order to achieve
soundness?
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A Proofs of Security for Protocol 8
Locality
Since the protocol is written as an LE-MIP in which P̂ = V̂ = ∅, the protocol
is local by definition 7.
Completeness
Completeness follows from the completeness of the underlying protocol [8],
and the fact that the commitment protocol (protocol 7) is well-defined for honest
provers (who will never send a commitment that they cannot unveil).
Soundness
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Without loss of generality, we may assume that the soundness error in the
BFL protocol to be 1/3, through sequential amplification. The probability that
our commitment scheme (protocol 7) fails binding is exponentially small in k.
Local probabilistic provers are equivalent to local deterministic provers. This is
because the success probability α of randomized provers of breaking soundness
is an average over the randomized provers’ random tapes. Each instance of a
random tape represents a deterministic strategy. Therefore there is a determin-
istic strategy which succeeds with probability at least α, and hence we only need
to consider local deterministic provers.
Since P1 is deterministic, we may unambiguously consider what happens if
we were to “rewind” the prover machine. Suppose that at some point P1 unveils
a particular commitment c to 0. We rewind P1 and let V1 make different choices
before that point. Suppose that, with these alternate choices, P1 then unveils c to
1 (an attempt to break binding). Because of locality, P1’s behavior is independent
of what P2 receives (namely z2). Therefore, there is only one such z2 which V0
will ultimately accept as a valid unveiling of c in both ways (recall that our
commitment is statistically binding).
Therefore, in the worst case, for every commitment there exists a sequence of
interactions between V1 and P1 such that P1 will attempt to break the binding
of that commitment. Each such commitment-breaking corresponds to at most
one string z2 that will actually work.
Let us denote the set of such binding-breaking strings by B. If z2 /∈ B, then
the provers will not break binding, and the soundness error is reduced to that of
the underlying protocol (at most 1/3). On the other hand, since |B| < poly(k),
the probability that z2 ∈ B is at most poly(k)/2k.
Therefore, the soundness error of our protocol is at most
Pr[z2 /∈ B and underlying protocol accepts] + Pr[z2 ∈ B] ≤ 1
3
+
poly(k)
2k
.
Zero-Knowledge The simulation will be divided in two parts. In the first part,
the simulator produces a transcript of the pre-computation, multilinearity test
and sumcheck with oracle parts, which involves only interactions with V1. In the
second part, the simulator will fake a valid consistency test.
Protocol 10. ( Perfectly Indistinguishable, PR-Local Simulator for Pro-
tocol 8, Part 1)
The setup:
– Let (Ŝ, S1, S2) be a set of locality-explicit simulators.
– S1 and S2 can send Ŝ an index along with a bit.
– Ŝ completes the indexed PR box (protocol 7) for both simulators.
The simulation strategy:
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1. The simulators agree on unique indices for every commitment used
in the protocol.
2. S1 interacts with V1 the way P1 would. Whenever P1 should commit,
S1 commits to random bits, just like the single-simulator from section
5.
3. For each commitment, V2 sends S2 a string s. S2 sends to Ŝ the index
of the commitment and s.
4. Ŝ runs the PR box (protocol 7) and replies with V2’s half of the
output.
5. Whenever S1 needs to unveil a commitment, it can be unveiled in
the way S1 desires by sending the corresponding index and bit to Ŝ.
6. Ŝ completes the corresponding PR box which outputs t. Ŝ sends t
to S1.
7. S1 sends t to V1.
The second part (the consistency test) can be done by having the simulators
ignore the question.
Protocol 11. ( Perfectly Indistinguishable, PR-Local Simulator for Pro-
tocol 8, Part 2)
1. V1 sends i to S1.
2. S1 computes Ω1 = H γ (Qi).
3. Using Ŝ to break binding, S1 convinces V1 that Ω1 is actually
A(Qi) ⊕H γ (Qi).
4. S1 unveils Ω1 for V1, who gets Ω1 = Hγ(Qi).
5. V2 sends Q
′
i to S2.
6. S2 responds with Ω2 = Hγ(Q
′
i).
By the properties of the strongly-universal-2 hash H, if Qi = Q
′
i then
Ω1 = Ω2. Otherwise Ω1 6= Ω2 with probability exponentially close to one. This
produces the result as desired. The simulators then feed the transcripts to V0,
and terminates simulation.
B Babai, Fortnow and Lund’s MIP for Languages in
NEXP
This section describes a variant of the multi-prover protocol for oracle-3-SAT
found in [8]. We refer to this as the BFL protocol, or BFL classic.
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Definition 10. Let r, s > 0 be integers. Let z, b1, b2, b3 be strings of variables,
where |z| = r and |bi| = s. Let B(z, b1, b2, b3, t1, t2, t3) be a Boolean formula in
r + 3s + 3 variables. A Boolean function A : {0, 1}s → {0, 1} is a 3-satisfying
oracle for B if
B(z, b1, b2, b3, A(b1), A(b2), A(b3)) = 1
for every string z, b1, b2, b3.
B is oracle-3-satisfiable if such a function A exists.
The Oracle-3-SAT problem (B, r, s) asks whether a Boolean formula B is
oracle-3-satisfiable, where r and s denote the lengths of z and bi, as above.
Lemma 2. Oracle-3-SAT is NEXP-complete.
Definition 11. Let F be an arbitrary field. Let φ : {0, 1}m → {0, 1} be a
Boolean function. An arithmetization of φ is a polynomial f(x1, . . . , xm) ∈
F[X1, . . . , Xm] such that for all z ∈ {0, 1}m, φ(z) = 0 ⇔ f(z) = 0. A spe-
cific one is given in [8], proposition 3.1 .
Equivalently, the φ(z) = 0⇔ f(z) = 0 condition can be replaced with φ(z) =
1⇔ f(z) = 0.
Protocol 12. ( Sumcheck Protocol )
Let φ(x1, . . . , xm) be the 3-CNF formula which the prover P is trying to
show to be a tautology to a verifier V . Let F be a field of sufficient size
(of order at least (3c+ 1)m will suffice where c is the number of clauses
of φ).
1. V takes φ and computes its arithmetization f according to [8] Propo-
sition 3.1 and sends it to P .
2. V and P agree on a set I ⊂ F of size at least 2dm where d is the
degree of f .
3. V assigns b0 = 0, which is supposed to be equal to the sum
1∑
x1=0
. . .
1∑
xm=0
f(x1, . . . , xm)
2 = 0
4. i← 1.
5. P sends the coefficients of the univariate polynomial in x,
gi(x) = h(r1, . . . , ri−1, x) =
1∑
xi+1=0
. . .
1∑
xm=0
f(r1, . . . , ri−1, x, xi+1, . . . , xm)2
6. V checks whether bi−1 = gi(0) + gi(1). If not, abort.
7. V chooses a random ri ∈ I, computes bi = gi(ri) and sends ri to P .
8. If i ≤ m then i← i+ 1 and go to step 4.
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9. V checks whether bm = f(r1, . . . , rm)
2.
Protocol 13. ( Babai, Fortnow and Lund’s MIP for Oracle-3-SAT )
Given (B, r, s) as common input.
1. (sumcheck with oracle) V and P1 execute protocol 12. Let (Qk+1, Qk+2, Qk+3) =
(rr+1...rr+s, rr+s+1...rr+2s, rr+2s+1...rr+3s) ∈ (Is)3 be V ’s questions
during this phase.
2. (multilinearity test) V asks P1 to simulate an oracle storing the
function A. V queries P1 with random, linearly related values in
Is. If any response does not satisfy linearity, abort protocol. Let
Q1, . . . , Qk ∈ Is be V ’s questions during this phase.
3. (non-adaptiveness test) V chooses uniformly at random an i such
that 1 ≤ i ≤ k+3 and asks Qi to P2. If P2’s answer differs from that
of P1, reject. Otherwise accept.
C Non-Locality – an introduction
In this section we solely focus on the two-party single-round games and strategies
that are sufficient to discuss and analyze most of the MIPs. Definitions and proofs
for complete generalizations to multi-party multi-round games and strategies will
appear in a forthcoming paper with co-author Adel Magra.
Games: Let V be a predicate on A×B ×X × Y (for some finite sets A,B,X,
and Y ) and let pi be a probability distribution on A×B. Then V and pi define a
(single-round) game G as follows: A pair of questions (a, b) is randomly chosen
according to distribution pi, and a ∈ A is sent to Alice and b ∈ B is sent to Bob.
Alice must respond with an answer x ∈ X and Bob with an answer y ∈ Y . Alice
and Bob win if V evaluates to 1 on (a, b, x, y) and lose otherwise.
Strategies: Two-Party Channels A strategy for Alice and Bob is simply a
probability distribution P(x,y|a,b) describing exactly how they will answer (x, y)
on every pair of questions (a, b). We now breakdown the set of all possible strate-
gies for Alice and Bob according to their non-locality.
Deterministic and Local Strategies: A strategy P(x,y|a,b) is deterministic if
there exists functions fA : A→ X, fB : B → Y such that
P(x,y|a,b) =
{
1 if x = fA(a) and y = fB(b)
0 otherwise
.
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A deterministic strategy corresponds to the situation where Alice and Bob agree
on their individual actions before any knowledge of the values a, b is provided to
them. In this case they use only their own input to determine their individual
output.
A strategy P(x,y|a,b) is local if there exists a finite set R and functions fA :
A×R→ X, fB : B ×R→ Y such that
P(x,y|a,b) =
|{r ∈ R : x = fA(a, r) and y = fB(b, r)|
|R| .
A local strategy corresponds to the situation where Alice and Bob agree on a
deterministic strategy selected uniformly among |R| such possibilities. The choice
r of Alice and Bob’s strategy, and the choice of inputs (a, b) provided to Alice
and Bob are generally agreed to be statistically independent random variables.
C.1 Local Reducibility
We now turn to the notion of locally reducing a strategy to another, that is
how Alice and Bob limited to local strategies but equipped with a particular
(not necessarily local) strategy U ′ are able to achieve another particular (not
necessarily local) strategy U . For this purpose we introduce a notion of distance
between strategies in order to analyze strategies that are approaching each other
asymptotically.
Distances between Strategies: Several distances could be selected here as
long as their meaning as it approaches zero are the same. In the definitions
below, U,U ′ are strategies and U ′ is a finite set of strategies.
Definition 12. |U,U ′| =
∑
a,b,x,y
|PU (x, y|a, b)− PU ′(x, y|a, b)|
Definition 13. |U,U ′| = min
U ′∈U ′
|U,U ′|
Local extensions of Strategies: For natural integer n, we define the set
LOCn(U) of strategies that are local extensions (of order n) of U to be all the
strategies Alice and Bob can achieve using local strategies where strategy U may
be used up to n times as sub-routine calls‖. If we restrict all the functions used
to be polynomial-time computable we analogously define LOC
poly
n(U).
Definition 14. U ′ Locally (poly-)Reduces to U (U ′ ≤LOC
(poly)
U) iff lim
n→∞|U
′, LOC
(poly)
n(U)| =
0.
Definition 15. U ′ is Locally (poly-)Equivalent to U (U ′ =LOC
(poly)
U) iff U ′ ≤LOC
(poly)
U ≤LOC
(poly)
U ′.
‖ Done by selecting functions f0A : A × R → A, f1A : A × X × R → A, ..., fn−1A :
A × Xn−1 × R → A, fnA : A × Xn × R → X to determine the input of each
sub-routine from input a and previous outputs.
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Non-Adaptive extensions of Strategies: For natural integer n, we define
the set NADn(U) of strategies that are Non-Adaptive extensions (of order n)
of U to be all the strategies Alice and Bob can achieve using Non-Adaptive
strategies where strategy U may be used up to n times as sub-routine calls∗∗. If
we restrict the functions used to be poly-time computable we get NAD
poly
n(U).
Definition 16. U ′ Non-Adaptively (poly-)Reduces to U (U ′ ≤NAD
(poly)
U) iff lim
n→∞|U
′,NAD
(poly)
n(U)| =
0.
Definition 17. U ′ is Non-Adaptively (poly-)Equivalent to U (U ′ =NAD
(poly)
U) iff
U ′ ≤NAD
(poly)
U ≤NAD
(poly)
U ′.
In general, Non-Adaptive reducibility is a weaker notion than local reducibil-
ity. However, for certain distributions U it may result that {D|D ≤LOC
(poly)
U} =
{D|D ≤NAD
(poly)
U} as follows.
C.2 Locality
We now define the lowest of the non-locality classes LOC. We could define it
directly from the notion of local strategies as defined above, but for analogy with
the other classes we later define, LOC is defined as all those strategies locally
reducible to a complete strategy we call ID (see Fig. 2). Of course, any strategy
is complete for this class.
a //
ID
boo
a //oo b
Fig. 2. an ID-box
Definition 18. LOC = {U |U ≤LOC ID} and LOC
poly
= {U |U ≤LOC
poly
ID}
Note: LOC is the class of strategies that John Bell [29] considered as classical
hidden-variable theories that he compared to entanglement. It is also the class
of strategies that BenOr, Goldwasser, Kilian and Wigderson [3] chose to define
classical Provers in Multi-Provers Interactive Proof Systems. LOC is also those
strategies Non-Adaptively reducible to ID
Definition 19. Alternatively, LOC = {U |U ≤NAD ID} and LOC
poly
= {U |U ≤NAD
poly
ID}
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a //
∅
boo
x //oo y
Fig. 3. an ∅-box where x ∈ X and y ∈ Y are uniform and independent of everything
else
Alternatively, we can also define LOC from an empty box as used in the core
of this paper
Definition 20. Alternatively, LOC = {U |U ≤NAD ∅} = {U |U ≤LOC ∅}
C.3 One-Way Signalling
We now turn to One-Way Signalling which allows communication from one side
to the other. We name the directions arbitrarily Left and Right. We define R-SIG
(resp. L-SIG) as all those strategies locally reducible to a complete strategy we
call R-SIG (see Fig. 4) (resp. L-SIG (see Fig. 5)). These classes are useful to
define what it means for a strategy to signal as well as the notion of No-Signalling
strategies.
a //
R-SIG
boo
a //oo a
Fig. 4. an R-SIG-box
Definition 21. R-SIG = {U |U ≤LOC R-SIG} and R-SIG
poly
= {U |U ≤LOC
poly
R-SIG}
Definition 22. We say that U Right Signals (is R-SIG-verbose††) iff R-SIG ≤LOC
U .
a //
L-SIG
boo
b //oo b
Fig. 5. an L-SIG-box
∗∗ Done by selecting functions f0A : A×R→ A, f1A : A×R→ A, ..., fn−1A : A×R→ A,
fnA : A×Xn×R→ X to determine the input of each sub-routine from input a only.
†† We define the notion of L-verbose in analogy to NP-hard: it means “as verbose as any
distribution in non-locality class L”. In consequence, a distribution U is L-complete
if U ∈ L and U is L-verbose.
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Definition 23. L-SIG = {U |U ≤LOC L-SIG} and L-SIG
poly
= {U |U ≤LOC
poly
L-SIG}
Definition 24. We say that U Left Signals (is L-SIG-verbose) iff L-SIG ≤LOC
U .
Definition 25. We say that U Signals iff U Right Signals or Left Signals.
We prove a first result that is intuitively obvious. We show that the complete
strategy R-SIG cannot be approximated in L-SIG and the other way around.
Theorem 14. R-SIG 6∈ L-SIG and L-SIG 6∈ R-SIG.
Proof. Follows from a simple capacity argument. For all n, all the channels in
LOCn(R-SIG) have zero left-capacity, while L-SIG has non-zero left-capacity.
And vice-versa.
C.4 Signalling
We are now ready to define the largest of the non-locality classes SIG. Indeed
every possible strategy is in SIG.
Definition 26. SIG = {U |U ≤LOC SIG} and SIG
poly
= {U |U ≤LOC
poly
SIG}
a //
SIG
boo
b //oo a
Fig. 6. a SIG-box
Definition 27. We say that U Fully Signals (is SIG-verbose) iff U Right Signals
and Left Signals.
C.5 No-Signalling
We finally define the less intuitive non-locality class NOSIG in relation to classes
defined above.
Definition 28. NOSIG = R-SIG
⋂
L-SIG and NOSIG
poly
= R-SIG
poly
⋂
L-SIG
poly
.
A similar characterization may be found in [35] Section 3 and [36] Corollary
3.5.
Theorem 15. . The above definition of NOSIG exactly coincides with the tra-
ditional notion of No-Signalling [37].
26
L-SIG R-SIG핊핀픾
핃핆ℂ
ℕ핆핊핀픾
|핃핆ℂ⟩
ℂ핆필핆ℙ
L-핊핀픾 R-핊핀픾
SIG
ID
R BGRBG
PR, ??
??
ℕ픸픻
L-SIG R-SIG핊핀픾
핃핆ℂ
ℕ핆핊핀픾
|핃핆ℂ⟩
ℂ핆필핆ℙ
L-핊핀픾 R-핊핀픾
SIG
ID
PR ??
??
Fig. 7. Non-locality Hierarchy and complete (two-party) distributions in each class.
a //
PR
boo
x //oo y
Fig. 8. a PR-box satisfying the CHSH condition,
that a ∧ b = x⊕ y, uniformly among solutions
Intuitively, a distribution P (x, y|a, b) is No-Signalling as long as for every a
the x|b and for every b the y|a channels have zero capacity.
Note: Forster and Wolf [38] have proved that PR (see Fig. 8) is complete
for NOSIG distributions under an asymptotic definition similar to ours.
Fig. 7 shows the relation of these classes as well as the case obtained via
quantum entanglement (|LOC〉) as considered by Bell [29] and via commuting-
operators (COMOP) as defined by Ito, Kobayashi, Preda, Sun, and Yao [39]. We
include those for completeness but will not discuss these particular classes any
further in this work.
Definition 29. We say that U does not Signal iff U does not Right Signal nor
Left Signal iff U ∈ NOSIG.
D Visual description of the new model
D.1 Local Multi-Prover Interactive Proofs
In the Interrogation phase (see Fig. 9) V1, ..., Vk (equipped with an arbitrary
local correlator) individually interrogate P1, ..., Pk (equipped with an arbitrary
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LOC
poly
LOC
P1 V1 V2 P2
V1 V0V2
Fig. 9. Interrogation phase (top) followed by decision phase (bottom).
local correlator). At the end of the interactive part, all the V1, ..., Vk report to
V0 who takes the final decision. The corresponding complexity class is MIP =
MIPLOCLOC
poly
= NEXP.
D.2 Entangled Multi-Prover Interactive Proofs
|LOC〉
poly
|LOC〉
P1 V1 V2 P2
Fig. 10. Interrogation phase.
In the Interrogation phase (see Fig. 10) V1, ..., Vk (equipped with an arbitrary
entangled correlator) individually interrogate P1, ..., Pk (equipped with an arbi-
trary entangled correlator). At the end of the interactive part, all the V1, ..., Vk
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report to V0 who takes the final decision. The corresponding complexity class is
MIP∗ = MIP|LOC〉|LOC〉
poly
⊇ NEXP.
D.3 No-Signalling Multi-Prover Interactive Proofs
NOSIG
poly
NOSIG
P1 V1 V2 P2
Fig. 11. Interrogation phase.
In the Interrogation phase (see Fig. 11) V1, ..., Vk (equipped with an arbitrary
No-Signalling correlator) individually interrogate P1, ..., Pk (equipped with an
arbitrary No-Signalling correlator). At the end of the interactive part, all the
V1, ..., Vk report to V0 who takes the final decision. The corresponding complexity
class is MIPns = MIPNOSIGNOSIG
poly
= EXP.
As noted before, most MIPs found in the literature are actually (non-adaptive)
local-verifier MIPs (see Fig. 12) yielding for instance MIPns = MIPNOSIGLOC
poly
.
LOC
poly
NOSIG
P1 V1 V2 P2
Fig. 12. Interrogation phase.
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D.4 A New, Stronger Flavour of Zero-Knowledge
Traditionally zero-knowledge is defined as a property of the honest provers for
all (polynomial-time) verifiers
∀polyV ′ ∃polyS ∀x∈L ∀w VIEWV ′ [P1, ..., Pk, V ′](w, x) = S(w, x).
However, in the present context, the fact that the simulation of V ′’s view via
a single centralized simulator S, achieving zero-knowledge is rather easy because
such an S can cheat the binding property of the commitments at will. The
intuition behind the original definition is that the verifier is unable to convince a
third party (a Judge J0) because the VIEW he reports (see Fig. 13) could have
been equally created (with the same distribution) by a simulator. Nevertheless,
a stronger flavour of zero-knowledge is achieved if the simulator is not invoking
its full signalling power whenever the verifier does not use such power.
J0V
′
w
Fig. 13. (Interac/Simula)tion-Distinction phase.
For all non-locality levels starting with Ŝ and up, the simulators Si do not
need more non-local power than the verifiers V ′i . The ultimate (strongest) notion
of “LOC
poly
-local ZK” being ZK
poly
LOC because at all levels V ′ is simulated by a
simulator with no extra non-local power, whereas at the opposite end of the
spectrum ZK
poly
SIG is what is generally considered zero-knowledge with a single
simulator or a group of signalling simulators.
This stronger notion of zero-knowledge is particularly interesting in the rel-
ativistic bit-commitment scenario where a pair of judges may provide separate
auxiliary-inputs to spatially separated verifiers pretending to be speaking to
powerful provers. If the verifiers can report their conversation fast enough to the
judges (but not interact with the judges however), they must be able to do so
without invoking signalling because of the distance separating them. If a pair of
simulators can produce the same distribution of views in the same context, we
obtain a stronger flavour of zero-knowledge (See Fig. 14).
The results of this paper, depending on the specific bit commitment used,
may be achieved under a stronger flavour of zero-knowledge if a member of the
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|LOC〉
V̂′
V ′1 V
′
2
J1 J2
w1 w2
|LOC〉
Ŝ
⋃
V̂′
S1 S2J1 J2
w1 w2
J1 J2 J0
w1, w2
Fig. 14. Interrogation or Simulation phase (top) followed by Distinction phase (bot-
tom).
non-locality class Ŝ is enough to break the binding property of the commit-
ments. For instance, the result of section 5 is really ZK
poly
NOSIGMIPLOCLOC
poly
= NEXP
although existing proofs usually mean ZK
poly
SIGMIPLOCLOC
poly
= NEXP. Using the bit
commitment scheme based on the magic square game of [40] we can also obtain
ZK
poly
|LOC〉MIPLOCLOC
poly
= NEXP.
Some interesting questions resulting from this definition is whether any higher
class such as ZK
poly
LOCMIPLOCLOC
poly
or ZK
poly
NOSIGMIPNOSIGNOSIG
poly
contains more than the nat-
ural examples such as GRAPH ISO or CODE EQUIV already found in the most
natural class ZK
poly
SIGMIPSIGSIG
poly
= ZKIP.
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D.5 A note on notation
ZKSMIPPV
is the complexity class of Zero-Knowledge Multi-provers Interactive Proofs where
(honest and dishonest) provers are restricted to non-locality class P (important
for soundness), where the honest verifier is from non-locality class V (also im-
portant for soundness), and where the Zero-Knowledge simulators are from non-
locality class S unless V̂ ′ is outside of S in which case they are from the class of
V̂ ′.
E CMOSSY 3-COL Honest-Verifer Zero-Knowledge
Interactive Proof
Protocol 16. Two-out-of-Three-Prover, 3-COL.
The verifiers V1, V2, V3 pre-agree on random edges (n0, n1) and (n2, n3),
random strings r0, r1, r2, r3 6= 0 and the provers P1, P2, P3 pre-agree on
random values bni : ni∈V and a random 3-colouring ofG: {cni ∈{0, 1, 2} : ni∈V }
such that (ni, nj)∈E =⇒ cnj 6= cni . They also pre-compute an array
W [ni, r] := bni ·r+cni : ni∈V, r∈{1, 2}. The values (n0, n1, r0, r1), (n2, n3, r2, r3)
are selected under one of three constraints: either
(n0, n1) = (n2, n3), r0 6= r2, r1 6= r3 or
∃i, j∈{0, 1} × {2, 3} : ni = nj , ri = rj or
(n0, n1) = (n2, n3), (r0, r1) = (r2, r3).
The verifiers V1, V2, V3 pre-select PA, PB at random from P1, P2, P3.
Commit phase:
– PA receives nodes n0, n1, strings r0, r1 from VA and if (n0, n1)∈E,
replies W [n0, r0],W [n1, r1].
– PB receives nodes n2, n3, strings r2, r3 from VB and if (n2, n3)∈E,
replies W [n2, r2],W [n3, r3].
Check phase:
Consistency Test:
– if (n0, n1) = (n2, n3), (r0, r1) = (r2, r3) then VA, VB accept iff
(W [n0, r0],W [n1, r1]) = (W [n2, r2],W [n3, r3]).
Edge-Verification Test:
– if (n0, n1) = (n2, n3), r0 6= r2, r1 6= r3 then VA, VB accept iff
W [n0, r0] +W [n2, r2] 6= W [n1, r1] +W [n3, r3].
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Well-Definition Test:
– if ∃i, j ∈ {0, 1} × {2, 3} : ni = nj , ri = rj then VA, VB accept iff
W [ni, ri] = W [nj , rj ].
Protocol 17. HV Two-prover simulation.
Commit phase:
– Let pi be a uniform permutation of {0, 1, 2} and let coco := 0.
– ∀n∈V, r∈{0, 1, 2}, letmark[n, r] := false, count[n] := 0, colour[r] :=
pi(r).
– S runs V1, V2, V3 until it receives (n2A−2, n2A−1, r2A−2, r2A−1),
(n2B−2, n2B−1, r2B−2, r2B−1) from VA, VB .
– Whenever (n2i−2, n2i−1)∈E is provided by Vi,
S replies (w2i−2, w2i−1), both computed as follows for k∈{2i−2, 2i−
1}:
• If ¬mark[nk, rk] then
∗ If count[nk] = 0 then pick W [nk, rk] uniformly in {0, 1, 2}.
∗ If count[nk] = 1 then
· Let W [nk, rk] := −colour[coco]−W [nk,−rk]
· Let coco := coco+ 1.
∗ Let mark[nk, rk] := true, count[nk] := count[nk] + 1.
• Let wk := W [nk, rk].
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